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Abstract. Adversarial training is promising for improving robustness
of deep neural networks towards adversarial perturbation, especially on
classification tasks. Effect of this type of training on semantic segmenta-
tion, contrarily, just commences. We make the initial attempt to explore
the defense strategy on semantic segmentation by formulating a general
adversarial training procedure that can perform decently on both ad-
versarial and clean samples. We propose a dynamic divide-and-conquer
adversarial training (DDC-AT) strategy to enhance the defense effect,
by setting additional branches in the target model during training, and
dealing with pixels with diverse properties towards adversarial pertur-
bation. Our dynamical division mechanism divides pixels into multiple
branches automatically, achieved by unsupervised learning. Note all these
additional branches can be abandoned during inference and thus leave
no extra parameter and computation cost. Extensive experiments with
various segmentation models are conducted on PASCAL VOC 2012 and
Cityscapes datasets, in which DDC-AT yields satisfying performance un-
der both white- and black-box attack.
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1 Introduction
Recent work has revealed that deep learning models, especially in classification
tasks, are often vulnerable to adversarial samples [21,8,19]. Adversarial attack
can deceive the target model by generating crafted adversarial perturbations on
original clean samples. Such perturbations are often imperceptible. Such threat
also exists in semantic segmentation [26,16,1]. As shown in Fig. 1, on various
datasets, state-of-the-art segmentation models [30,4] can be easily fooled by ad-
versarial perturbation, causing poor performance on these adversarial regions.
There is seldom work to improve the robustness of semantic segmentation
networks. As a universal approach, adversarial training [8,13,15] is effective to
enhance the target model in classification by training models with adversarial
samples. In this paper, we study the effect of adversarial training on the seman-
tic segmentation task. We find that adversarial training impedes convergence on
clean samples, which also happens in classification. Thus we set our goal as mak-
ing networks perform well on adversarial examples and meanwhile maintaining
good performance on clean samples.
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(a) Image (b) No Defense (c) With Our Defense
Fig. 1. For each image in (a), the left side is the normal data while the right side is
perturbed by adversarial noise. (b) shows that adversarial attack could fail existing
segmentation models. We provide an effective defense strategy shown in (c). The top
and bottom rows are results with structure of PSPNet and DeepLabv3 respectively.
For semantic segmentation task, each pixel has one classification output.
Thus the property of every pixel in one image toward adversarial perturbation
might be different. Based on this motivation, we design a dynamic divide-and-
conquer adversarial training (DDC-AT) strategy. We propose to use multiple
branches in the target model during training, each handling pixels with a set
of properties. During training, a “main branch” is adopted to deal with pixels
from adversarial samples and pixels from clean samples that are not likely to
be perturbed; an “auxiliary branch” is utilized to deal with pixels from clean
samples that are sensitive to perturbations.
Moreover, such divide-and-conquer setting is dynamical. During training,
pixels stay near the decision boundary from clean samples are initially set to the
“auxiliary branch”. They become more insensitive to perturbation in the net-
work, and finally move back to the “main branch” for processing. Such dynamical
procedure is implemented by training a “mask branch” via unsupervised learn-
ing. With this mechanism, our method reduces performance deterioration over
clean samples. Experiments manifest that such mechanism also improves robust-
ness towards adversarial samples. Another notable advantage of our proposed
DDC-AT is that branches apart from the main one can be abandoned during
inference. Thus parameters and computation cost remain almost the same.
We conduct extensive experiments with various segmentation models on both
PASCAL VOC 2012 [7] and Cityscapes [5] datasets. Our standard adversarial
training strategy is effective to improve the robustness of semantic segmentation
networks. Our new DDC-AT strategy further boost the effectiveness of defense. It
yields superior performance under both white- and blackbox adversarial attack.
Our main contribution is threefold.
– It is the first attempt (up to paper submission) to have comprehensive explo-
ration on the effect of adversarial training for semantic segmentation. Our
standard adversarial training can be treated as a strong baseline to evaluate
defense strategies for semantic segmentation networks.
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– We propose the DDC-AT to notably improve the defense performance of
segmentation networks on both clean and adversarial samples.
– We conduct experiments with various model structures on different datasets,
which manifest the effectiveness and generality of DDC-AT.
2 Related Work
Adversarial Attack Adversarial attack can be divided into two categories of
white-box attack [2,8], where attackers have complete knowledge of the target
model, and black-box attack [18,17], where attackers have almost no knowledge
of the target model. Existing adversarial attack methods focus on solving im-
age classification problems. Such attack is normally achieved by computing or
simulating the gradient information of target models [8,22,6,12]. Meanwhile, as
indicated by several recent papers [26,16,1], the semantic segmentation networks
are also vulnerable to adversarial samples.
Adversarial Defense Current defense methods for classification task can be
divided into four kinds. 1) Changing the input of networks to remove pertur-
bation [10]. 2) Adopting random strategy to obtain correct output [25]. 3) De-
signing robust structures for different tasks [27]. 4) Adversarial training, which
adds adversarial samples into training procedure [13,22,20]. No literature exists
yet to improve robustness of semantic segmentation networks. Previous defense
methods for semantic segmentation networks aim at the detection of adversarial
regions [24]. However, detection only is not enough since the model still give in-
correct prediction. We advocate that the model should accomplish correct output
for adversarial samples during inference.
Adversarial Training Adversarial training can improve robustness of networks
to a certain degree. Goodfellow et al. [8] first increased the robustness by feeding
the model with both original and adversarial samples. Many researchers proposed
follow-up work [13,22,3,11,23,28]. Due to the universality of adversarial training,
we introduce it into the defense of semantic segmentation networks.
3 Attacking Semantic Segmentation
Given semantic segmentation network f and input x, the segmentation output
is o = f(x), where x ∈ RH×W×3 and o ∈ RH×W×K – H, W and K are the
height, width and number of classes respectively. For a clean sample xclean,
pixel xclean(i, j) is called “clean pixel”; for the adversarial sample xadv, which is
obtained by adding perturbation on xclean, pixel xadv(i, j) is called “adversarial
pixel”, paired with xclean(i, j). The standard cross-entropy loss is adopted as
L(f(x), y), where y is the one-hot label of x.
Adversarial sample for f can be generated by computing the gradient infor-
mation of f [1]. For example, given clean input xclean and its one-hot label y,
FGSM attack [8] perturbs xclean as:
xadv = xclean + × sign(5xclean(L(f(xclean), y))), (1)
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Algorithm 1 Standard adversarial training
Parameter: clean training set X, segmentation network f , maximum number of train-
ing iterations Tmax
1: Number of iteration T ← 0
2: while T 6= Tmax do
3: Load a mini-batch of data Db = {xclean1 , ..., xcleanm } from the training set X.
4: Use f and the chosen attack to obtain adversarial samples Ab = {xadv1 , ..., xadvm }.
5: Design the training batch as {xclean1 , ..., xcleanbm/2c, xadvbm/2c+1, ..., xadvm } from Db and
Ab, and compute the loss for this training batch. Update parameters of the
network f by back propagation.
6: T ← T + 1
7: end while
where xadv is the resulting image with adversarial perturbation.  constrains
the level of perturbation. Further, iterative adversarial attack would cause more
serious threat. BIM [12] is such an approach – it has parameters for perturbation
range , step range α, and start with xadv0 = xclean – as:
xadvt+1 = clip(xadvt + α× sign(5xadvt (L(xadvt , y))), (2)
where xadvt is the adversarial sample after the t-th attack step.
4 Standard Adversarial Training
We first design our standard adversarial training (SAT) on semantic segmenta-
tion task. We find that models trained with adversarial samples only largely drop
performance on clean samples, and this leads to the phenomenon that the results
on adversarial samples are better than those on clean samples. This phenomenon
is called “label leaking” [13]. Models with “label leaking” are not suitable for
the evaluation of robustness.
Thus, to ensure the performance on both clean/adversarial samples and avoid
label leaking, we use mixed data where clean and adversarial samples are equally
included in each batch during training. This mix strategy can scale up adversarial
training to large models and datasets in classification [13]. It also works for
semantic segmentation.
The detailed procedure of SAT is list in Alg. 1. This algorithm yields reason-
able defense effect on various datasets and meets part of our requirement as the
standard adversarial training.
5 Dynamic Divide-and-Conquer Adversarial Training
To further boost the robustness of semantic segmentation networks against ad-
versarial samples, we propose a more effective dynamic divide-and-conquer ad-
versarial training (DDC-AT) strategy in the following over SAT.
5.1 Divide-and-Conquer Procedure
DDC-AT adopts divide-and-conquer procedure during training, as shown in Fig.
2 (b) and explained as the following. 1) Divide: for an input image x, DDC-AT
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Fig. 2. Motivation and overall framework of DDC-AT. (a) Clean pixels in the output
space are divided into two categories by divide-and-conquer strategy. (b) Main branch is
utilized to conquer adversarial pixels, and clean pixels stay far away from classification
boundary. The auxiliary branch is employed to conquer clean pixels that are sensitive to
perturbation. The mask branch divides pixels into these two branches dynamically. The
final output o is combined from the division during training. In testing, both auxiliary
and mask branches are abandoned, and only main branch is utilized to output on.
divides its pixels into two sub-tasks for two branches respectively. 2) Conquer:
each branch predicts labels for the pixels assigned to it. 3) Merge: predictions
from two branches are merged into the overall prediction of image x.
Dividing Pixels As shown in Fig. 2 (a), clean pixels in output space can be
divided into two types during training.
1) Clean pixels and their paired adversarial pixels are in the same classification
space (in the Safe Training Area). The properties of clean and adversarial pix-
els are similar in this output space. They are likely to stay far away from the
boundary. Their distribution can be aligned in an identical branch with adver-
sarial training. We call such clean pixels, without boundary property, A.
2) Paired clean and adversarial pixels are in diverse classification space. Such
clean pixels are likely to stay near the classification boundary (in the Perturba-
tion Sensitive Region). They have “boundary property” since they are easy to
be perturbed through the boundary. Directly aligning them with the adversarial
pixels in the identical branch is difficult, since the distribution is complex. Thus,
we propose to first use two different branches to train them respectively. Once
the clean and their adversarial pixels stay in the same space, we use an identical
branch to align them. We call such clean pixels, with boundary property, B.
In short, we divide pixels in one clean image into different kinds according to
whether they have “boundary property”. The “boundary property” describes if
clean pixels and the corresponding adversarial pixels have different predictions.
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm to obtain ground truth for training of mask branch fm
Parameter: clean data xclean, one-hot label y, all-zero matrix 0, matrix function
F = 1[N ] (F(i, j) = 1 if N (i, j) is True)
1: Obtain output ocleann , o
clean
a , and o
clean
m for x
clean from fn, fa, and fm respectively.
Obtain label map from ocleanm as p
clean.
2: Compute combined output oclean = ocleana pclean+ocleann  (1−pclean), its label
map is Bclean, Bclean(i, j) ∈ {0, 1, ...K − 1}.
3: Use loss L(ocleann , y) to generate adversarial examples xadv.
4: Obtain output oadvn , o
adv
a , and o
adv
m for x
adv from fn, fa, and fm respectively.
Obtain label map from oadvm as p
adv.
5: Compute combined output oadv = oadva  padv + oadvn  (1− padv) with label map
Badv, where Badv(i, j) ∈ {0, 1, ...K − 1}.
6: Generate “mask label” for xclean as Mclean = 1[Bclean 6= Badv], Mclean ∈ RH×W .
7: Generate “mask label” for xadv as Madv = 0 with the same shape of Mclean.
8: return Mclean, Madv, xclean, and xadv.
Conquering Pixels Based on the above division setting, we set our framework
as shown in Fig. 2 (b), which consists of three branches. They are “main branch”,
“auxiliary branch” and “mask branch”, denoted by fn, fa and fm respectively. fn
and fa can be utilized to conquer pixels, i.e., predicting labels for pixels through
forwarding the corresponding networks. We use “main branch” to conquer A,
as well as all adversarial pixels, and use “auxiliary branch” to conquer B. In
this way, clean pixels in one image after division can be processed by different
branches. In additional, fn and fa have shared backbone, which means they help
each other in the feature level. It is noteworthy that only the main branch is
used for inference.
Merging Pixels As shown in Fig. 2 (b), divided pixels after conquering can be
merged. This is because all pixels in one clean image are divided into fn and fa,
and there is no overlap between the pixels assigned to fn and fa. Thus they can
be merged into the final prediction of the input image to compute loss, according
to the division. Moreover, this also indicates that the output space to decide the
division should be the combination of fn and fa during training.
5.2 Dynamical Division and Implementation
In this section, we illustrate the dynamical property of division setting in DDC-
AT, and explain how such division is achieved through unsupervised learning.
Dynamical Division During training, B is first set to the auxiliary branch for
training. Once such clean pixels turn into A, they move to the main branch.
Since the auxiliary branch is specially designed for the training of B, it can
remove boundary property for such clean pixels effectively to ensure that more
clean pixels gradually move into the main branch.
In this design, the main branch finally trains all clean pixels to stay far
away from the boundary. Such mechanism effectively helps avoid decrease of
performance on clean samples. Moreover, training adversarial pixels with A can
improve the robustness towards adversarial perturbation for the main branch.
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Algorithm 3 Dynamic divide-and-conquer adversarial training for semantic
segmentation networks
Parameter: clean training set X, shared backbone S, main branch fn, auxiliary branch
fa, mask branch fm, training batch size m, and maximum training iteration Tmax
Number of iterations T ← 0
1: while T 6= Tmax do
2: Load a mini-batch of data Db = {xclean1 , ..., xcleanm } from X, load their one-hot
labels as Yb = {y1, ..., ym}.
3: Use current state of network {S, fn, fa, fm}, Db, and Yb in Alg. 2 to generate
adversarial examples Ab = {xadv1 , ..., xadvm }, and obtain “mask label” for Db and
Ab as M
clean
b = {Mclean1 , ...,Mcleanm } and Madvb = {Madv1 , ...,Madvm }.
4: Compute output from fm for Db, and obtain the label map {pclean1 , ..., pcleanm }.
5: Compute output from fm for Ab, and obtain the label map {padv1 , ..., padvm }.
6: Compute {qclean1 , ..., qcleanm }, where qcleani = 1− pcleani ;
Compute {qadv1 , ..., qadvm }, where qadvi = 1− padvi .
7: Design training batch as Tb = {xclean1 , ..., xcleanbm/2c, xadvbm/2c+1, ..., xadvm },
Mb = {Mclean1 , ...,Mcleanbm/2c,Madvbm/2c+1, ...,Madvm },
Pb = {pclean1 , ..., pcleanbm/2c, padvbm/2c+1, ..., padvm },
Qb = {qclean1 , ..., qcleanbm/2c, qadvbm/2c+1, ..., qadvm }.
8: Compute loss by Eqs. (3) and (4) with Tb, Yb, Pb and Qb. Update weights of
network {S, fn, fa} by back propagation.
9: Compute loss by Eq. (5) using Tb and Mb. Update weights of {S, fm}.
10: T ← T + 1
11: end while
Division Implementation via Unsupervised Learning DDC-AT requires
to distribute all adversarial pixels into fn, and adopt dynamical division for clean
pixels. Such division can be implemented by setting a “mask branch” fm.
First, fm predicts the division for pixels as shown in Fig. 2 (b). For input x,
output from fn, fa, and fm is on, oa, and om ∈ RH×W×2 respectively. The label
map of om is p ∈ RH×W , which is a binary matrix to decide division. p(i, j) = 1
means pixel x(i, j) is sent to fa. Otherwise, it moves to fn. This operation yields
the combined output for x as o = oa  p+ on  (1− p), as shown in Fig. 2 (b).
Here  is the Hadamard product. If xclean is perturbed to xadv, we denote the
combined output as oclean and oadv, which are obtained in the same way.
Next, the ideal division scheme is based on these combined outputs. This
scheme has a “mask label” notation M ∈ RH×W . M(i, j) = 1 means the pixel
in (i, j) location is “divided into fa”. Otherwise, it is “divided into fn”. We set
the mask label for xclean as M clean, and denote the label map of oclean and oadv
as Bclean and Badv respectively.
For pixel xclean(i, j), if Bclean(i, j) 6= Badv(i, j), it should set into fa since it
has the boundary property. In this case, we set M clean(i, j) = 1. Otherwise, it
should set into fn, making M
clean(i, j) = 0. Besides, all adversarial pixels should
be sent to fn, and we set the mask label for x
adv as Madv = 0.
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Madv and M clean are obtained according to the ideal division rule in DDC-
AT. We can use them as the ground truth to train fm. Repeating the whole
process makes fm learn how to achieve ideal division for pixels automatically.
The pipeline to obtain Madv and M clean is listed in Alg. 2. Such training is un-
supervised where learning of fm does not need external supervised information.
In addition, since B will be turned into A, they will be assigned into main
branch fn progressively during training. Thus, the mask branch finally assigns
all pixels into fn, and the predicted mask has almost all zero values.
5.3 Overall Loss Function
For the training data x (xclean or xadv), its label map obtained from the mask
branch is p ∈ RH×W , and we set q as q = 1− p. The loss of x for fn and fa can
be written as
Ln = E
(
−
K−1∑
i=0
[yi · log(fn(x)i)] q
)
, (3)
La = E
(
−
K−1∑
i=0
[yi · log(fa(x)i)] p
)
, (4)
where E is the operation to compute the mean value.
Turn the mask label M , which is obtained in Alg. 2 for x, into one-hot form
M˜ , we write the loss for fm as
Lm = E
(
−
1∑
i=0
[M˜i · log(fm(x)i)]
)
. (5)
Combined with Eqs. (3), (4) and (5), the overall loss term is
Lall = λ1Ln + λ2La + λ3Lm, (6)
where λ1, λ2 and λ3 are all set to 1 in experiments. The overall training procedure
is concluded in Alg. 3.
5.4 Superiority of Divide-and-Conquer
DDC-AT is designed to be superior than SAT and this is proved in the exper-
iments part, in Sec. 6. It gets much better performance than classical SAT on
both clean and adversisal pixels. We list the detailed explanation as below.
1) First, for the training of clean pixels in the main branch fn, training with A
only (setting of DDC-AT) is much easier than mixed training with both A and
B (setting of SAT). The introduced auxiliary branch fa in DDC-AT can turn B
into A gradually and effectively. Thus, the main branch fn that is adopted for
inference can better handle clean pixels and improve accuracy over SAT.
2) Second, to obtain decent results on adversarial pixels, SAT trains adversarial
pixels with both A and B, while DDC-AT trains adversarial pixels with only A
for the main branch fn. Obviously, training with both A and B causes higher
difficulty for learning adversarial pixels than training with A only. Thus, DDC-
AT yields higher accuracy on adversarial pixels.
DDC-AT for Robust Semantic Segmentation 9
6 Experiments
6.1 Experimental Dataset
The newly proposed dynamic divide-and-conquer adversarial training (DDC-AT)
strategy is effective for robust semantic segmentation. We use two representa-
tive datasets for the evaluation of semantic segmentation networks. They are
PASCAL VOC 2012 [7] and Cityscapes [5] datasets.
PASCAL VOC 2012 [7] dataset focuses on object segmentation. It contains
20 object classes and one background, with 1,464, 1,499 and 1,456 images for
training, validation and testing respectively. The training set is augmented to
10,582 images in [9], which is also adopted in our work.
Cityscapes The Cityscapes [5] dataset is collected for urban scene understand-
ing with 19 categories for semantic segmentation evaluation. It contains high
quality pixel-level annotations with 2,975, 500 and 1,525 images for training,
validation and testing respectively.
6.2 Training and Evaluation
Training We choose popular semantic segmentation architectures PSPNet [30]
and DeepLabv3 [4] for experiments. We follow the hyper-parameters as suggested
in [29] for all models. Both SAT and DDC-AT train networks with augmentation
of adversarial samples, which are generated by a white-box BIM attacker. The
main reason for choosing BIM is that we find models trained with single-step
attack (e.g. FGSM) are more likely to introduce “label leaking” [13]. We however
do not observe such phenomenon when trained with BIM.
BIM Attacker BIM is adopted as the form of untargeted attack [12]. The
maximum perturbation value is set to  = 0.03 × 255 (by L∞ constraint). The
consideration is that perturbation can be visually noticed by human [1] with
larger values. The attack step size and number of attack iterations are set as
α = 0.01× 255 and n = 3 for training respectively.
Evaluation We use the mean of class-wise intersection over union (mIoU) as
our evaluation metric. The parameters  and α are kept constant during training.
For each training mini-batch, half of the input includes adversarial samples that
are dynamically decided by current model states, resulting in variance of results.
For both SAT and DDC-AT, we train for one more time and report the average
results as well as their standard deviation.
6.3 Results on VOC
In this section, we evaluate SAT and DDC-AT on VOC dataset under both
white- and black-box attack.
White-Box Attack In this attack, attackers utilize the exact gradient infor-
mation of the target model [2]. For each model structure and dataset, we train
SAT and DDC-AT to report the mean and standard deviation. Specifically, for
the evaluation of robustness, we consider the number of BIM attack iteration
number n ranging from 1 to 7.
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Table 1. Evaluation under white-box attack on VOC. “No Defense” means normal
training without adversarial samples. “clean” means mIoU on clean samples. Results in
columns “1” to “7” are mIoUs under BIM attack with attack iteration number ranging
from 1-7. “Mean” means the mean value of mIoU, and “Std” means the standard
deviation of mIoU. The setting of “No Defense” is stable, thus we only report its mean
value. Bold font is for the highest average performance.
Methods clean
Model: PSPNet
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mean
No Defense 0.769 0.371 0.189 0.111 0.078 0.062 0.054 0.048
SAT 0.743 0.521 0.681 0.707 0.445 0.404 0.279 0.264
DDC-AT 0.760 0.535 0.756 0.723 0.479 0.470 0.338 0.332
Std
SAT 0.005 0.042 0.018 0.008 0.029 0.032 0.032 0.032
DDC-AT 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.022 0.040 0.040 0.046
Methods clean
Model: DeepLabv3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mean
No Defense 0.775 0.374 0.196 0.119 0.081 0.064 0.055 0.048
SAT 0.727 0.507 0.624 0.645 0.431 0.385 0.288 0.266
DDC-AT 0.752 0.518 0.699 0.678 0.436 0.447 0.323 0.326
Std
SAT 0.010 0.040 0.006 0.010 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.010
DDC-AT 0.001 0.006 0.013 0.011 0.005 0.030 0.012 0.020
Image Ground Truth No Defense DDC-AT
Fig. 3. Visual comparison on VOC. Top two rows are obtained from models with
PSPNet, and bottom two rows are derived from models with DeepLabv3.
White-Box Attack Results The results of different defense methods on VOC
are shown in Table 1. In this table, we compare our methods with the baseline
(model trained with clean samples only, i.e., no defense). Notably, without de-
fense, BIM attack yields sharp performance decrease. Under untargeted attack
setting, the results approach zeros when the attack iteration number is large.
Table 1 basically indicates that results on adversarial samples with large
attack iteration number represent the lower bound of each method on adversarial
perturbation, since the corresponding performance drops with the increase of n,
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Table 2. Evaluation under black-box attack on VOC. All symbolic representation has
the same meaning as that of Table 1.
Methods clean
Model: PSPNet
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mean
No Defense 0.769 0.433 0.240 0.148 0.106 0.078 0.060 0.058
SAT 0.743 0.584 0.565 0.535 0.513 0.471 0.449 0.415
DDC-AT 0.760 0.596 0.615 0.564 0.534 0.486 0.461 0.437
Std
SAT 0.005 0.032 0.029 0.027 0.028 0.027 0.042 0.041
DDC-AT 0.001 0.021 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.031 0.039 0.040
Methods clean
Model: DeepLabv3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mean
No Defense 0.775 0.445 0.246 0.148 0.105 0.083 0.070 0.064
SAT 0.727 0.567 0.518 0.518 0.510 0.470 0.450 0.431
DDC-AT 0.752 0.583 0.604 0.547 0.526 0.483 0.460 0.436
Std
SAT 0.010 0.023 0.038 0.033 0.037 0.040 0.041 0.050
DDC-AT 0.001 0.020 0.051 0.035 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.016
and converges when n is large (actually, the mean value of mIoU does not change
more than 0.025 when n is 10 or 20, compared with the results when n=7). This
leads to the conclusion that SAT is already reasonable: it improves results from
0.048 to 0.264 on PSPNet and 0.048 to 0.266 on DeepLabv3 when n = 7. Further,
the standard deviation of SAT is low, which means SAT is stable.
DDC-AT in Table 1 gives results of our final framework. Performance of
DDC-AT on clean samples increases compared with SAT (by 0.017 and 0.025 on
PSPNet and DeepLabv3 respectively), consistent with our design motivation.
Further, the performance of DDC-AT is higher than SAT notably under each
attacker iteration on average. Intriguingly, the best case of SAT under every
attack iteration is almost the worst case of DDC-AT. For example, when the
attack iteration n = 3, we have 0.707 + 0.008 < 0.723 − 0.005 on PSPNet and
0.645 + 0.010 < 0.678− 0.011 on DeepLabv3.
More interestingly, for unseen attack, DDC-AT clearly improves robustness
over SAT. Small standard deviation for DDC-AT indicates that results are stable.
We also provide visual comparison on VOC in Fig. 3 for comparing result quality.
Black-Box Attack Black-box attackers cannot utilize the exact gradient in-
formation of the target model. Instead, gradient information from a substitute
network, which is defensively trained on the same dataset [18,17,14], can be
adopted. In our evaluation setting, the perturbation for trained PSPNet models
is generated by DeepLabv3, trained on the same dataset and enhanced with ad-
versarial training, and vice versa. For SAT and DDC-AT, the substitute networks
are the same for fair comparison.
As described in Sec. 6.2, models trained with the same method and dataset
may have diverse behavior. To reduce evaluation bias from training randomness,
we evaluate SAT and DDC-AT on dataset D̂ in the following way. Using training
strategy Ŝ (SAT or DDC-AT) with model structure f̂ on D̂, we obtain model
set M̂1. Then using adversarial training with model structure different from f̂
on D̂, we obtain model set M̂2 as substitute defensive networks. Finally, for each
model in M̂1, we use attack generated from each model in M̂2 for evaluation.
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Table 3. Performance comparison of defense setting in ablation study on VOC. Sym-
bolic representation is the same as that of Table 1.
Methods clean
Model: PSPNet
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mean
SAT 0.743 0.521 0.681 0.707 0.445 0.404 0.279 0.264
DDC-AT-M 0.751 0.511 0.690 0.690 0.441 0.463 0.304 0.318
DDC-AT-N 0.748 0.528 0.737 0.694 0.456 0.460 0.318 0.330
DDC-AT 0.760 0.535 0.756 0.723 0.479 0.470 0.338 0.332
Methods clean
Model: DeepLabv3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mean
SAT 0.727 0.507 0.624 0.645 0.431 0.385 0.288 0.266
DDC-AT-M 0.741 0.505 0.720 0.666 0.451 0.435 0.314 0.304
DDC-AT-N 0.741 0.506 0.683 0.665 0.426 0.415 0.312 0.302
DDC-AT 0.752 0.518 0.699 0.678 0.436 0.447 0.323 0.326
Black-Box Attack Results Results under black-box evaluation on VOC are
included in Table 2. Performance of clean models also decreases along with the
increase of attack iteration, like the white-box situation. This phenomenon sug-
gests that there is strong transferability for adversarial samples in the semantic
segmentation task. It is therefore meaningful to evaluate robustness under this
black-box setting.
In comparison between DDC-AT and SAT, we use the same hyper-parameters
as white-box attacks. From Table 2, it is clear that SAT also improves the defense
effect. The standard deviation of SAT is larger than the results by white-box
attacks because black-box perturbation for each model is obtained from a set of
substitute networks, which have different adversarial behaviors.
The final performance of DDC-AT is consistently higher than SAT with at-
tack iteration number ranging from 1 to 7. Meanwhile, the standard deviation of
our method is lower in all cases, especially under unseen attack. It proves that
DDC-AT is more stable and effective than SAT by all types of attack.
6.4 Ablation Study
The motivation of DDC-AT is to dynamically divide pixels with/without bound-
ary property into diverse branches during training. We prove our division setting
is better than other alternatives by adjusting the division setting for pixels with
boundary property. The common alternatives are the following.
– Use “main branch” to deal with pixels from clean and adversarial samples
without boundary property. Use “auxiliary branch” to process pixels from
clean and adversarial samples with boundary property. We name this setting
DDC-AT-M.
– Use “main branch” to deal with pixels from clean samples, pixels from adver-
sarial samples without boundary property. Use “auxiliary branch” to solve
pixels from adversarial samples with boundary property. We name this set-
ting DDC-AT-N.
– Use only “main branch” to deal with pixels from either clean or adversarial
samples. This is what SAT does, thus we do not train the mask branch.
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Table 4. Results on clean samples of Cityscapes.
Method PSPNet DeepLabv3
Mean Value
No Defense 0.746 0.748
SAT 0.690 0.694
DDC-AT 0.717 0.713
Standard Deviation
SAT 0.010 0.010
DDC-AT 0.001 0.003
Table 5. Evaluation of our method and the baseline under black-box attack on
Cityscapes. Symbolic representations are same as Table 1.
Methods
Model: PSPNet
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mean
No Defense 0.476 0.280 0.141 0.069 0.039 0.033 0.022
SAT 0.511 0.444 0.399 0.367 0.320 0.308 0.291
DDC-AT 0.561 0.506 0.425 0.379 0.339 0.323 0.306
Std
SAT 0.005 0.030 0.026 0.033 0.023 0.026 0.025
DDC-AT 0.004 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.002 0.002
Methods
Model: DeepLabv3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mean
No Defense 0.482 0.299 0.153 0.076 0.044 0.031 0.024
SAT 0.507 0.432 0.394 0.361 0.328 0.316 0.297
DDC-AT 0.523 0.478 0.416 0.378 0.341 0.328 0.311
Std
SAT 0.008 0.030 0.028 0.030 0.022 0.023 0.025
DDC-AT 0.006 0.019 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.004
For all these methods, only main branch is utilized during testing. We evalu-
ate the performance of these alternatives and list results in Table 3. For PSPNet
model, the performance of DDC-AT-N is higher than SAT and lower than DDC-
AT. The average results of DDC-AT-M are comparable with SAT and are worse
than DDC-AT. Similarly, for DeepLabv3 model, the average results of DDC-AT-
M and DDC-AT-N are lower than DDC-AT, and higher than SAT consistently.
In summary, the division setting of DDC-AT is optimal among these common al-
ternatives. We include the detailed visual illustration and the standard deviation
of results for these alternatives in the supplementary material.
6.5 Results on Cityscapes
White-Box Attack Results of different methods on clean samples are included
in Table 4. DDC-AT effectively reduces drop of performance on clean samples,
compared with SAT. In fact, DDC-AT improves mIoU on clean samples by 0.027
and 0.023, which are significant with the setting of PSPNet and DeepLabv3,
compared with SAT. The results of DDC-AT are also more stable over SAT.
We show results of different defense methods under white-box attack on
Cityscapes dataset in Fig. 4. Obviously, clean models get worse with the in-
crease of attack iterations, like the case in VOC, which proves general effect
of adversarial attack for different datasets. The results of DDC-AT and SAT
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Fig. 4. Results under white-box attack on Cityscapes, which are plotted by lines (for
mean values) with error bars (denoting standard deviation).
under various attack iterations are like we observe before – they also improve
robustness of the models on this large dataset. DDC-AT outperforms SAT in
Fig. 4 where the best cases of SAT under every attack iteration are actually
worse than the worst cases of DDC-AT. The deviation in Fig. 4 indicates that
both DDC-AT and SAT are stable, while DDC-AT is even better.
Black-Box Attack The results under the evaluation of black-box attack for
the Cityscapes dataset are shown in Table 5. DDC-AT also outperforms SAT
on average with different attack iterations. The standard deviation of DDC-
AT is still strictly smaller than that of SAT. For example, when n = 5 ∼ 7, the
standard deviation of SAT is larger than 0.020 for both PSPNet and DeepLabv3,
while standard deviation of DDC-AT is smaller than 0.005.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the property of adversarial training on the se-
mantic segmentation task. Our defense strategy can consistently enhance the
robustness of target models under adversarial attack. Besides proposing the stan-
dard adversarial training (SAT) process, we propose a new strategy to improve
the performance of adversarial training in this task, with no extra parameter and
computation cost introduced during inference. The extensive experimental re-
sults with different model structures on two representative benchmark datasets
suggest that the proposed method achieves significantly better generalization
and stability on unseen adversarial examples and clean samples, compared with
standard adversarial training and other alternatives.
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